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There were several cases of interest in South Carolina this
year in which actions for declaratory judgments were contested
on the pleadings. In Guiarin & Doan, In. v. Georgetown Tew-
tile and Manufacturing Co.' an action arose out of the construc-
tion of an industrial plant for Georgetown Manufacturing Co.
by M. B. Kahn Construction Co. Kahn subcontracted the air-
conditioning work to Guimarin and Doan, Inc., which, in turn,
subcontracted installation of the ducts to Commercial Roofing
and Sheet Metal Co. and installation of the temperature controls
to Johnson, Service Co. Georgetown Manufacturing Co. claimed
that the plant machinery had been damaged by water leakage
and made a claim against Kahn which was settled for $22,500.
Kahn, in turn, claimed that amount against Guimarin and
Doan and withheld a balance due on its subcontract. Guimarin
and Doan then brought this action for declaratory judgment to
declare the rights and liabilities of the parties under the related
construction contracts.
Commercial and Johnson each demurred to the complaint.
The case went up on appeal from an order of the circuit court
overruling these demurrers. The complaint alleged that all of
the cooling work had been performed properly and stated sev-
eral other theories as to what caused the damage. The complaint
also asked that the plaintiff be entitled to indemnity from either
Cominercial or Johnson or both if it should be determined by
the court that such damage was caused by them. From the facts
there was the justiciable controversy between the parties man-
datory for a declaratory judgment.2
The first ground of appeal was misjoinder of causes of action.
The court held that the complaint stated only a cause of action
for declaratory judgment and that the other damage theories in
the complaint were important only to the extent that they bore
upon Guimarin's entitlement to the declaration which it sought."
Another contention of the appellants was that the only con-
troversy involving them was the factual issue of proper per-
formance of their respective subcontracts which should be tried
1. No. 18665 (S.C., June 9, 1967).
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by a jury in an action at law. It has generally been held that
the granting of a declaratory judgment rests in the sound dis-
cretion of the court to be exercised in furtherance of the pur-
poses of the Declaratory Judgments Act.4 The court admitted
that the authorities were in conflict upon the issue of whether
a declaratory judgment could be granted where a factual dispute
was involved. Our court took the liberal approach and held that
the existence of another remedy and the presence of complicated
issues of fact may be considered by the court in exercising its
discretion as to whether declaratory relief should be granted but
that neither was ground for sustaining a demurrer. This view
was taken by the United States Supreme Court in Aetna Life
Insuranve Co. v. Haworth.5 In that case, the Court decided a
factual issue under the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act and
declared that "[t]he legal consequences flow from the facts and
it is the province of the courts to ascertain and find facts in
order to determine the legal consequences. This is everyday
practice."6
The appellants' final contention was that it is impermissible
to bring a declaratory action for the purpose of determining
which of several defendants is liable to the plaintiff when it is
admitted that a recovery can be had against only one. Appel-
lants cited Town of Manchester v. Tow of Townshend7 to sup-
port their contention. The court felt that this decision was not
consistent with the terms and spirit of the Declaratory Judg-
ments Act. The court accepted the contrary position that a
declaratory judgment could be brought against several defend-
ants when recovery could be had against only one.8 The judg-
ment of the lower court overruling the demurrers was affirmed.
In Banko of Augusta v. Satcher Motor Co.,9 L. E. Pate, who
was in possession of the original manufacturer's certificate of
4. "The statute providing for declaratory judgments meets a real need and
should be liberally construed to accomplish the purposes intended, i.e., to afford
a speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicating legal disputes without invok-
ing any coercive remedies of the old procedure, and to settle legal rights and
remove uncertainty and insecurity from legal relationships without awaiting a
violation of the rights or a disturbance of the relationships." Williams Furni-
ture Co. v. Southern Coatings & Chemical Co., 216 S.C. 1, 6, 56 S.E.2d 576,
578 (1949) quoting from Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Quarles, 92 F.2d 321, 325
(4th Cir. 1937).
5. 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
6. Id. at 242.
7. 109 Vt. 65, 192 A. 22 (1937).
8. United States Guarantee Co. v. Harrison & Oven Produce Co., 240
Ala. 186, 198 So. 240 (1940).
9. 249 S.C. 53, 152 S.E.2d 676 (1967).
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origin for an automobile issued by Satcher Motor Co. showing
no lien thereon, executed to the plaintiff a chattel mortgage on
the auto securing payment of a note. It was alleged that Satcher
wilfully and unlawfully by use of duplicate keys repossessed the
auto and sold it to Robert Brown and issued him a duplicate
certificate of origin showing a lien in favor of Commercial
Credit Corporation. The plaintiff alleged that its mortgage
constituted a first lien on the vehicle, that default had been
made in payments due, and that plaintiff was entitled to pos-
session. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment establish-
ing priority of its mortgage over claims of Satcher and Com-
mercial. Brown brought a cross action against Satcher to re-
cover damages for alleged fraud in representing to him that the
auto was not subject to encumbrances. Satcher demurred to the
actions by the bank and Brown, and Commercial demurred to
the action by the bank. The lower court overruled the demurrers
and appeal was taken.
In sustaining the decision of the lower court, the court stated
the well-established rule that in an action for declaratory judg-
ment a complaint is not subject to demurrer for failure to state
a cause of action if the facts alleged show the existence of a jus-
ticiable controversy. 10 The court held that the allegations clearly
showed an actual controversy. The defendants contended that
the plaintiff had other remedies available and, therefore, the
action for declaratory judgment was not proper. The court held
that even though the plaintiff had available actions for claim
and delivery and foreclosure of its chattel mortgage, the Uni-
form Declaratory Judgments Act provides that this fact alone
would not bar an action for declaratory relief."
The fact that the plaintiff alleged illegal conversion in his
complaint did not constitute misjoinder of issues. The complaint
set out an action for declaratory judgment and the allegation of
conversion by Satcher was inserted to show such acts as might
affect the title subsequently acquired by the second purchaser.
The complaint did not set out a cause of action for conversion.
The court sustained Satcher's demurrer to the cross action by
10. See, e.g., Dantzler v. Callison, 227 S.C. 317, 88 S.E2d 64 (1955) ; Foster
v. Foster, 226 S.C. 130, 83 S.E2d 752 (1954).
11. "Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power
to declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief
is or could be claimed." S.C. CODE AxN. § 10-2002 (1962). Construed in
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Brown on the ground that his cause of action for fraud and
deceit had no relation to the action by the bank and thus could
not be pleaded as a cross action. A cross action may be filed
when the cause of action arises from or is germane to the trans-
action set forth in the complaint, but a cross action may not
introduce new matters which are outside the original contro-
versy.12 Since the plaintiff's cause of action related solely to
priority of liens, the action for fraud and deceit was not plead-
able in the action for declaratory judgment.
In Springield v. Williams Plumbing Supply Co.,13 the court
was confronted with the interesting question of whether in an
action for breach of an implied warranty it was necessary to
allege privity of contract in order to state a cause of action.
The plaintiffs sought to recover damages for personal injuries
and property damage sustained when a hot water heater ex-
ploded in their home. It was alleged that the heater was manu-
factured by Row Con Co. who sold it to Williams Plumbing
Supply Co. who, in turn, sold it to Meaders Co., Inc. Meaders
sold the heater to the plaintiffs and installed it in their home.
The complaint alleged that an implied warranty had been made
by each of the defendants that the water heater was free from
any defects. Row Con Co. and Williams Supply Co. moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that it did not state a cause
of action in that there was no privity of contract between them
and the plaintiffs. The South Carolina Supreme Court treated
the motion to dismiss as a demurrer, and on appeal upheld the
decision of the lower court in overruling the demurrers.
The court recognized the general rule in South Carolina
"that privity of contract is required in an action for breach
of an implied warranty and that there is no such privity be-
tween a manufacturer and one who has purchased the manufac-
tured article from a dealer or is otherwise a remote vendee."' 14
The court gave a discussion of products liability law and
noted that the entire field is in a state of flux and that the trend
in such cases today is generally away from the requirement of
privity of contract. The court pointed out that when the cause
of action is based on negligence, there is no requirement of
privity in South Carolina.15
12. Brown v. Quinn, 220 S.C. 426, 68 S.E2d 326 (1951).
13. 249 S.C. 130, 153 S.F.2d 184 (1967).
14. Odom v. Ford Motor Co., 230 S.C. 320, 325, 95 S.E.2d 601, 603-04
(1956).
15. Salladin v. Tellis, 247 S.C. 267, 146 S.E.2d 875 (1966).
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Odom v. Ford Motor Co.16 which laid down the privity re-
quirement was distinguished from the instant case in that the
court there was not concerned "with a factual situation where
serious, substantial personal injury and property damage were
admittedly caused by a defective appliance or product.""t
In reaching its decision the court relied on the following rule.
"It has been held that if a demurrer to a pleading raises merely
a doubtful question or that the case is such that justice may be
promoted by a trial on the merits, the court should exercise a
fair, judicial discretion to that end, although it may be that in
technical points the grounds of demurrer are sustainable under
strict law."' 8 Apparently this rule had not been considered
before in South Carolina in connection with a demurrer although
substantially the same rule has been applied to motions to strike
defective pleadings.19 Since the question presented was one of
novel impression, the court decided that justice could best be
served by having a trial on the merits rather than by ruling on
the pleadings.
In Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. South Carolina
Insurance Co.,2 0 an action was brought by the plaintiff (first
insurer) for amounts allegedly due because of the defendant's
(second insurer) withdrawal from an action. The lower court
sustained a demurrer to the complaint for insufficiency of facts
to state a cause of action and appeal was taken. It appeared
that in sustaining the demurrer, the lower court considered facts
not set forth in the complaint, thus violating the elementary
rule that in passing on a demurrer the court is restricted to the
facts as they appear in the pleadings.2 1 The court reversed the
order sustaining the demurrer.
In Kline v. City of ColuZnbia,22 the plaintiff's property was
damaged by an explosion and fire allegedly caused by leaking
gas coming into contact with a suspended gas heater. The com-
plaint alleged that the city negligently pulled loose a gas line
while in the process of widening a public street. The cause of
16. 230 S.C. 320, 95 S.E.2d 601 (1956).
17. Springfield v. Williams Plumbing Supply Co., 249 S.C. 130, 134, 158
S.E.2d 184, 186 (1967).
18. Id. at 138, 158 S.E2d at 188, quoing from CJ.S. Pleading § 265 (1951).
19. See, Sams v. Sams, 247 S.C. 467, 148 S.E.2d 154 (1966); Archambault
v. Sprouse, 215 S.C. 336, 55 S.E.2d 70 (1949).
20. 249 S.C. 120, 153 S.E.2d 124 (1967).
21. Fleming v. Pioneer Life Ins. Co., 178 S.C. 226, 182 S.E. 154 (1935).
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action for damages against the city was based on section 47-70
of the Code23 and Article I, Section 17, of the state constitu-
tion.24 On appeal, the demurrer of the City of Columbia was
overruled. The court held that the complaint stated a good
cause of action under the constitution in that the damage caused
by the gas leakage was just as much a taking of property as if
some government authority had backed water over the plain-
tiff's premises.
The question of whether there was a cause of action under the
statute depended on how it should be construed and the par-
ticular question had never been decided. The court followed its
decision in Springfield v. Williams Plumbing Supply Co.25 and
held that a decision as to whether a good cause of action had been
stated could best be determined by a trial on the merits.
The defendant claimed that the plaintiff's cause of action for
a taking of property was improperly joined with the cause of
action against the power company for negligence. Clarke v. City
of Greer2" was cited to support this contention. However, that
case was easily distinguishable in that the cause of action under
the constitution against the city was joined with an action
against a contractor for both actual and punitive damages. In
the instant case only actual damages were sought against both
defendants, and since there is no distinction in South Carolina
between "damage" and "taking,"27 the measure of damages
against both defendants was the same. The court found no mis-
joinder of issues.
"Warren v. Allstate Insurance Company28 involved an action
for the alleged wrongful breach of an assigned risk insurance
policy in that the defendant cancelled the plaintiff's certificate
of insurance with the Highway Department. The court in over-
ruling a demurrer held that the insured's complaint for alleged
wrongful cancellation of the insurance certificate followed by
the mandatory suspension of the insured's driver's license was
sufficient to state a cause of action for breach of the insurance
23. S.C. CODE Aim. § 47-70 (1962).
24. S.C. CoNsT. art. 1, § 17.
25. 249 S.C. 130, 153 S.E.2d 184 (1967).
26. 231 S.C. 327, 98 S.E.2d 751 (1957).
27. Collins v. City of Greenville, 233 S.C. 506, 105 S.E.2d 704 (1958) ; Webb
v. Greenwood County, 229 S.C. 267, 92 S.E.2d 688 (1956); White v. Southern
Ry., 142 S.C. 284, 140 S.E. 560 (1927); Wilson v. Greenville County, 110 S.C.
321, 96 S.E. 301 (1918).
28. 152 S.E.2d 727 (S.C. 1967).
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contract even though there was no allegation of breach of any
specific provision of the policy.
29
II. MoTioN To STRI ATLLEGATONS
In Rochester v. North Greenville Junior College, ° the plain-
tiff alleged that warning signs were posted near the intersection
where the automobile accident occurred showing on the top sign
"school bus crossing" and on the lower sign "35 M.P.H." The
lower court struck the allegation concerning these signs on the
grounds that they were irrelevant since the plaintiff was not a
passenger on a school bus, that no school bus was involved in
the accident, and that the accident occurred at a time when a
school bus would not ordinarily be using a highway. On appeal
the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the lower court
ruling and observed that the lower court misconstrued the
meaning of the signs. The established rule, that in order to base
liability on the violation of a statute or highway warning sign,
the plaintiff must establish that he was a member of the class
for whose protection the statute was adopted or the sign
erected,31 did not bar the plaintiff's right to allege the existence
of the signs. Speed was an important factor in the case, and the
signs fixed the speed in the area. They applied to the public
generally, and the particular time of day or the fact that no
bus was involved in the accident was immaterial. The order
striking the allegation was reversed.
In Myers v. Moderm Homes Supply (o.,32 the lower court
overruled a motion to strike certain allegations in the complaint,
and the defendant appealed. The court dismissed the appeal and
reaffirmed the general rule in South Carolina that an order
refusing to strike allegations in the pleadings is not subject to
an interlocutory appeal. 3
Rimer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Com-
pany34 restated the established rule that a motion to strike
language from a pleading is addressed to the sound discretion
29. For a discussion of the court's reasoning, see this case surveyed under
the heading Insurance supra at 588.
30. 249 S.C. 89, 153 S.E.2d 121 (1967).
31. See, e.g., Carma v. Swindler, 228 S.C. 550, 91 S.E2d 254 (1956) ; Wright
v. South Carolina Power Comm'n, 205 S.C. 327, 31 S.E2d 904 (1944).
32. 154 S.E2d 729 (S.C. 1967).
33. See, e.g., DePass v. Piedmont Interstate Fair Ass'n, 217 S.C. 38, 59
S.E.2d 495 (1950) ; Bowden v. Powell, 194 S.C. 482, 10 S.E2d 8 (1940).
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of the trial judge and his ruling on such a motion will, there-
fore, not be disturbed on appeal in absence of a clear showing of
prejudicial error.85 Here the court found no prejudicial error
in denying the defendant's motion to strike certain allegations.
III. MOTION TO MAKE CompxL& -T Morx D mnrn A CETAN
In Airfare, Io. v,. Greenville Airport Commiss~o7 6 an action
was brought for breach of a lease contract and to enjoin further
interference with the plaintiff's use of the leased premises. The
issue before the court in this case was whether there had been an
abuse of discretion by the lower court in requiring the plaintiff
to make its complaint more definite and certain. Since a circuit
court judge in South Carolina has wide discretion in passing on
such a motion,87 the ruling of the court in passing on a motion
to make a complaint more definite and certain will not be dis-
turbed unless it clearly appears that the appellant has been
prejudiced. 8 The complaint had alleged that the plaintiff's
business operations had been disrupted and discontinued, causing
a loss of profits. The court found no abuse of discretion nor any
prejudice in requiring the complaint to be made more definite
and certain.
IV. EMzmio oi Rnijmnus
In Jaoobson v. Yaschik,89 the plaintiff alleged a fraudulent
breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiff by the defend-
ant. The plaintiff sought an accounting for the loss sustained
by her as a result of the breach of the fiduciary duty. The com-
plaint also asserted a cause of action for actual and punitive
damages based on the same fraudulent breach of duty. The de-
fendant demurred to the complaint and moved to have the plain-
tiff elect the cause of action under which she would proceed. The
lower court ordered the plaintiff to elect whether she would
proceed on the first or second cause of action. In overruling
35. J.M.S., Inc. v. Theo, 241 S.C. 394, 128 S.E.2d 697 (1962); Ellen v.
King, 227 S.C. 481, 88 S.E.2d 598 (1955).
36. 153 S.E.2d 846 (S.C. 1967).
37. "[W]hen the allegations of a pleading are so indefinite or uncertain that
the precise nature of the charge or defense is not apparent the court may re-
quire the pleading to be made definite and certain by amendment." S.C. CODE
ANr. § 10-606 (1962).
38. See, e.g., Seegars v. WIS-TV, 236 S.C. 355, 114 S.E.2d 502 (1960);
Epstin v. Berman, 78 S.C. 327, 58 S.E. 1013 (1907).
39. No. 18667 (S.C., June 12, 1967).
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this order, the court stated that while in form two causes of
action were stated, in fact only one was stated. The sole wrong
committed by the defendant was the breach of fiduciary duty.
The court followed the established rule that when a plaintiff
invokes a remedy at law and one in equity against a defendant
at the same time for the same cause, upon application of the
defendant, the plaintiff may be compelled to elect whether he
will proceed with the legal or the equitable action. The com-
plainant will not be called on to elect, however, until the de-
fendant has answered. 40 The record did not reveal whether the
defendant had subsequently answered. The plaintiff was allowed
twenty days after the filing of the remittitur in the case or
twenty days following the joinder of issues, whichever came
later, in which to elect the action under which to proceed.
V. M~sCELLA ous
The freedom of a plaintiff to amend his complaint before
trial was an important issue in Morgan v. Liberty MutuaZ In-
surance Co.41 The plaintiff purchased an automobile from
Liberty Motors in Columbia, S. C., and the defendant insurance
company was the insurer of Liberty Motors. The dealer failed
to comply with the title requirements of the statute governing
the transfer of an automobile.42 The car rolled down a hill in
front of the plaintiff's home and into the home of Will Blue.
Blue brought an action in the state court against Morgan for
personal injuries. The plaintiff and her insurer, American
Mutual Fire Insurance Company, sought a declaratory judg-
ment in the federal district court to establish the liability of the
defendant insurance company for the damages suffered by Blue.
Both sides admitted that the defendant's policy provided cover-
age of $10,000 for personal injury and $5,000 for property dam-
age. The defendant filed a motion challenging the jurisdiction of
the federal court in that the amount in controversy did not
exceed the statutory minimum.
The defendant contended that under South Carolina law,
when a motorist suffers personal injury and property damage,
he is required to sue upon all claims in one action and any claim
40. 25 Am. Jur. 2d Election of Remedies § 31 (1966).
41. 261 F. Supp. 709 (1966).
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omitted is lost. 48 Since Blue only claimed personal injuries, the
maximum amount that the defendant would be liable for under
the policy was $10,000 which was less than the statutory mini-
mum required for jurisdiction by the federal court.44
The court, however, held that it had jurisdiction because the
amount in controversy might be more than $10,000. If Blue
owned the home, under South Carolina law he could amend his
complaint to include another cause of action for property dam-
age.45 The court stressed that South Carolina is liberal in allow-
ing amendments to a complaint before trial.40 Blue could amend
before the case went to trial or if he does not own the house, the
owner might bring suit for property damage within the six
years allowed.
47
When an automobile policy is involved in a proceeding for
declaratory judgment, the amount in controversy for jurisdic-
tional purposes is the maximum amount for which the insurer
could be liable under the policy.48 The defendant could be liable
for $15,000 under the policy, although at the time of this action
the defendant's liability was only $10,000. The motion of the
defendant was dismissed and jurisdiction remained in the federal
court for further proceedings.
AkcHn L. HARM-A
43. Powers v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 216 S.C. 309, 57 S.E2d 638 (1950);
Holcombe v. Garland Denwiddle, Inc., 162 S.C. 379, 160 S.E. 881 (1931).
44. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(b) (1966). Amount of controversy must exceed
10,000 dollars.
45. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-692 (1962).
46. See, e.g., Elliot v. Carroll, 179 S.C. 329, 184 S.E. 92 (1936); Knight,
Yancey & Co. v. Aetna Cotton Mills, 80 S.C. 213, 61 S.E. 396 (1908).
47. S.C. CODE ANN. 10-2002 (1962).
48. New Century Cas. Co. v. Chase, 39 F. Supp. 768 (S.D.W. Va. 1941).
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